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ABSTRACT
Given the depth of Venezuela’s economic crisis, many fear that the
government and the state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A.
(“PDVSA”) are on the brink of insolvency. In this paper, we introduce a
restructuring plan that would allow Venezuela to restructure its external
debt in an orderly manner. We propose that Venezuela restructure both
PDVSA debt and its own external debt via Exchange Offers. To maximize
the number of participating bondholders and receive sufficient debt relief,
we suggest that Venezuela primarily utilize the pari passu clauses included
in the vast majority of PDVSA and Venezuelan bonds, which are modified
versions of a typical pari passu clause and can be read to allow the
subordination of the bonds in accordance with Venezuelan law. To
minimize the number of holdout creditors, Venezuela can introduce a law
that subordinates non-exchanged debt to exchanged debt, making timely or
full payment of holdout debt unlikely. This tactic would minimize the need
to rely solely on alternative restructuring techniques, such as exit consents
and Collective Action Clauses (CACs). We argue that while these
techniques might alone prove insufficient to successfully restructure
Venezuela’s debt, they could supplement the restructuring options we
propose here. Because the parties contracted for debt subordination in the
bond contracts, we predict that using a debt subordination technique would
be more viable in Venezuela’s case than it has been in past sovereign debt
restructurings. Ironically, the pari passu clause that doomed Argentina
might be what saves Venezuela.
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INTRODUCTION

Venezuela is in the midst of a severe political and economic crisis.
The government and the state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela,
S.A. (“PDVSA”), are facing imminent default on their external debt
obligations. The risk of default has arguably increased as a result of the
United States’ recent sanctions targeting transactions in Venezuelan debt1
and the destabilization of crucial oil revenues from Texas caused by
Hurricane Harvey.2 A default by either the government or PDVSA would
be disastrous for the economy, prompting creditors to cash-strap the
government by seizing its assets abroad. A debt restructuring of some kind
thus seems inevitable, leading academics and practitioners to start thinking
about a restructuring strategy.3 In this paper, we introduce a novel plan that
would allow the Venezuelan government to restructure its external debt in a
manner that minimizes costly litigation, improves debt sustainability, and
gives the Republic time to deal with other pressing economic and
humanitarian issues.
This paper only tackles the restructuring of Venezuela’s external bond
indebtedness (“external debt”), which amounts to approximately $65
billion.4 We do not propose a plan for dealing with the Republic’s
remaining External Obligations, which include bilateral loans or arbitral
awards and collectively exceed $100 billion. The reason for the focus on
external debt is twofold. First, external debt restructuring is more amenable
to legal strategies, as the debt contracts are readily available and contain
provisions that make a restructuring possible. The same cannot be said for
other External Obligations, such as bilateral loans, as restructuring those
would predominantly be a diplomatic rather than a legal exercise. Second,
and more importantly, failing to restructure external debt – which is
primarily held by powerful hedge funds – might decrease Venezuela’s
bargaining power in “restructuring” all its other external obligations, as
1. Ben Bartestein & Christine Jenkins, Venezuelan Bonds Get Harder to Trade Thanks to
Sanctions Debts, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0831/venezuelan-bonds-get-harder-to-trade-as-sanctions-spur-caution.
2. Robin Wigglesworth & Gregory Meyer, Storm Harvey Adds to Headwinds for Venezuela
Bonds, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/dc547820-8d8d-11e7-9084d0c17942ba93.
3. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu G. Gulati, How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt (July 21,
2017), Duke
Law
Sch.
Pub.
Law
&
Legal
Theory
Series
No.
2017-52,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3006680 [hereinafter How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt]; Memorandum
from Citi Research - Citigroup Global Markets “Venezuela Credit Strategy View: Estimating the
recovery value in case of restructuring” (Aug. 8, 2017)(on file with authors).
4. See Mark Walker & Richard J. Cooper, Venezuela’s Restructuring: A Realistic Framework 3
(Sept. 19, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039678.
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other creditors are unlikely to be willing to effectively subsidize the full
payment of “vulture” funds.5
We propose that Venezuela restructure both PDVSA debt and its own
external debt by encouraging bondholders to participate in Exchange
Offers,6 which means that bondholders would agree to exchange their
existing bonds for new bonds of reduced net present value (“NPV”).7 The
success of the restructuring will be determined by the number of
participating bondholders. Simply put, if not enough bondholders choose to
participate by exchanging their bonds, Venezuela will not get the required
debt relief. Minimizing the number of non-participating (“holdout”)
creditors is thus a priority. While a sovereign has several strategic options
to minimize holdout creditors in an exchange offer,8 we suggest that
Venezuela use a debt subordination technique that can effectively serve the
dual role of carrot and stick for creditors deciding whether or not to
exchange their bonds. In this context, the technique requires the
subordination of non-exchanged debt to exchanged debt, and we believe it
to be the optimal strategy for encouraging broad creditor participation in
the restructuring. Other restructuring options, such as the use of exit
consents9 (recently proposed by Lee Buchheit and Mitu Gulati)10 and
Collective Action Clauses11 (“CACs”), remain available but should be

5. “Vulture” funds are hedge funds that specialize in buying debt of distressed sovereigns at a
heavily discounted price and then using various methods to retrieve the debt’s full value. Vulture funds
now likely hold increasing amounts of Venezuelan debt. See Landon Thomas Jr., Venezuelan Debt Now
Has
the
Vultures
Circling,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
14,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/14/business/venezuela-debtinvestors.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Flandon-thomasjr.&action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest
&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection&_r.
6. The paper assumes that a restructuring will be attempted when sanctions, which prohibit
transactions in Venezuelan debt (i.e. issuance of new debt), have either been removed or modified to
allow a traditional Exchange Offer.
7. The NPV reduction is necessary to lower the debt burden to a sustainable level, and it could
come either from reducing the bonds’ principal amount or from reducing their interest rate and
extending their maturities.
8. See Lee C. Bucheit & Elena L. Daly, Minimizing Holdout Creditors: Carrots, in SOVEREIGN
DEBT MANAGEMENT 3, 8 (Oxford University Press ed., 2013) (explaining that a sovereign can frighten,
deter, bind, or incentivize potential holdouts by using different legal techniques).
9. “Exit consent” is a technique that allows bondholders to exchange current bonds for new ones
and, in the process of exchanging (‘exiting’), vote via a qualified majority (usually 51% or 66.67%) to
strip the current bonds of important non-payment protections that would then bind all remaining nonexchanging bondholders holding those bonds.
10. See generally How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt, supra note 5.
11. CACs in bond contracts allow a supermajority (usually 75%) of bondholders to amend certain
terms of the contract referred to as “Reserved Matters” (e.g. payment terms), binding all bondholders.
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viewed as second-best options. As we explain, our strategy fills important
gaps that other proposals have not addressed. For this reason, those other
options should be viewed as supplementary techniques rather than primary
restructuring mechanisms.
To use the debt subordination technique effectively, we recommend
that Venezuela utilize the pari passu provisions included in approximately
90% of PDVSA’s and Venezuela’s bonds that can be read to allow for
subordination of those bonds by Venezuelan law. A typical pari passu
provision has been traditionally understood to protect creditors against
legal subordination of outstanding unsecured debt.12 This means that a
debtor cannot treat existing or future unsecured debt as legally senior to
any existing debt that includes the typical pari passu provision.13 The
infamous pari passu provision in Argentina’s bonds was effectively a
longer variant of this “typical” provision.14 But New York courts in the
Argentine litigation interpreted pari passu as protecting creditors from both
legal subordination of their bonds and from non-ratable payment (de facto
subordination) in the event of a default.15 This meant that a defaulting
sovereign, such as Argentina, could neither legally subordinate existing
debt, nor practically pay one creditor (i.e. exchanging bondholder) without
concurrently paying another (i.e. holdout). The “ratable payments”
interpretation therefore inhibits sovereign restructurings by severely
discouraging creditor participation in Exchange Offers, since a rational
creditor would choose to hold out and receive full payment rather than
exchange and receive reduced payment. While more recent New York
District Court decisions have arguably weakened this novel interpretation,16
The difference with ‘exit consents’ is that the latter requires a smaller qualified majority to amend
contractual terms, and the amendable terms are the non-payment terms.
12. Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments,
53 EMORY L.J. 869, 911–12 (2004). The Latin term pari passu literally translates to “in equal step” and
a typical pari passu provision would state that “the Notes rank, and will rank, pari passu in right of
payment with all other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness of the
Issuer.” Id. at 871.
13. Legal seniority of debt means that one creditor has a more senior legal right to payment than
other creditors in the event of a default.
14. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 249, 251 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The
Securities [bonds] will constitute . . . direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of
the Republic and shall at all times rank pari passu and without any preference among themselves. The
payment obligations of the Republic under the Securities shall at all times rank at least equally with all
its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness”)
15. It was specifically the second part of the Argentine clause that gave rise to the “ratable
payments” interpretation.
16. See White Hawthorne, LLC v. Republic of Argentina, No. 16-cv-1042, 2016 WL 7441699
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016); Ajdler v. Province of Mendoza, No. 17-CV-1530, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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there is still a risk that Venezuela’s pari passu clauses might be interpreted
in line with Argentina’s. For this reason, many experts suggest that
architects of Venezuela’s restructuring should use legal mechanisms to
remove pari passu clauses from the bond contracts governing the
restructuring in order to remove this risk.17
In contrast with experts that would remove pari passu clauses, we
believe that the pari passu clause should be retained in both PDVSA and
Venezuela bonds. In fact, we argue that Venezuela could and should use its
pari passu provisions as a powerful tool against holdouts. This is because
both the PDVSA and Venezuela pari passu provisions have been modified
from a “typical” (e.g. Argentinian) clause, in a way that would arguably
facilitate rather than impede Venezuela’s restructuring efforts. The
modified versions, copied in full in Part II (A) and Part III, include a
qualification that seems to expressly allow existing debt obligations to be
subordinated vis-à-vis other obligations identified by Venezuelan law.
Thus, we suggest that Venezuela enact – or threaten to enact – a law that
identifies exchanged debt as an obligation that would enjoy priority status
vis-à-vis non-exchanged debt. This would offer bondholders a “carrot” in
the form of priority payment if they choose to exchange, and a “stick” in
the form of subordinated payment (which might effectively mean nonpayment) if they choose to holdout.
It should be noted that this technique is not without risks. The
particular pari passu language in Venezuela’s bonds has never been tested
in court. Further, the debt subordination would have to be retroactive in
order to work, which could potentially give rise to claims of expropriation.
Nevertheless, we find that New York contract interpretation principles,
coupled with evidence from bond market pricing, support our interpretation
of the modified clause. Also, Venezuela has plausible defenses to counter
any claims of retroactive expropriation. Importantly, the success of this
plan does not depend on the actual ability of the current or future
122659 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 2, 2017). These decisions are not yet precedential, but are likely to be
persuasive in any future adjudication by a New York court. According to the court in these cases, mere
non-payment of bondholders, without some other “extraordinary act” by the debtor, was not sufficient
to constitute contractual breach of the pari passu provision. In other words, the court tried to limit the
“ratable payments” interpretation of the pari passu provision endorsed by the court in NML v.
Argentina. According to the court, an example of an “extraordinary act” would be Argentina’s passing
of the “Lock Law,” which effectively prohibited any and all future payments to holdouts.
17. See How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt, supra note 5, at 7; Walker & Cooper, supra note 6,
at 25; Ricardo Haussman & Mark Walker, Restructuring Debt in the Dark, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Oct.
6, 2016), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/debt-restructuring-perils-for-venezuela-byricardo-hausmann-and-mark-walker-2-2016-10?barrier=accessreg [hereinafter Restructuring Debt in
the Dark].
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government to formally adopt the suggested law; it suffices if creditors
merely perceive the government as willing and able to pass the legislation
at any point in time.
Our analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I assesses the key challenges
to restructuring Venezuelan debt and argues that these challenges can be
mitigated. Part II and Part III explain our specific proposals for
restructuring PDVSA and Venezuelan debt, respectively, and discuss the
anticipated legal risks associated with each.
II. VENEZUELA’S RESTRUCTURING: NECESSARY, COMPLEX,
BUT FEASIBLE
Information on the economic conditions in Venezuela is limited and
often inconsistent.18 The only certainty is that the Venezuelan economy has
taken a significant hit from the global decrease in the price of oil. While the
crisis was precipitated by an oil price decrease, however, the crisis is
neither wholly exogenous nor temporary. In other words, this is not a
liquidity crisis.19 To the contrary, the crisis is arguably structural because it
is linked to the unproductivity of the oil sector, and to the economic
distortions created by domestic price and currency controls.20 It is for these
reasons that markets have perceived the Venezuelan economy and PDVSA
to be on the brink of insolvency, and a restructuring appears inevitable.21
Restructuring Venezuela’s external debt would be a particularly
complex endeavor. Thus, we must account for several potential challenges
to the restructuring. These include (1) the heterogeneity of the debt
structure; (2) the fact that most of the external debt is likely held by
creditors who, in light of the outcome of the NML v. Argentina litigation,22
may have a higher propensity to hold out and litigate rather than
18. For instance, inflation rates and other key economic variables are reported differently in
different sources.
19. Dany Bahar & Sebastian Strauss, The Future of Venezuela: Are Reforms Enough to
Guarantee Solvency? THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2016/11/02/the-future-of-venezuela-are-reforms-enough-to-guarantee-solvency/.
20. Id.
21. According to recent data, the probability of default by PDVSA over the next 12 months is
92.7% (up from 50% in April). Ralph Cope, Venezuela Default Probability Reaches Record in
Bloomberg
Model,
BLOOMBERG:
PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES.
(June
28,
2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/venezuelan-default-probability-reaches-recordbloomberg-model. The probability of a credit event for Venezuela or PDVSA over the next 5 years is
99%. Ben Bartenstein, White House Sanctions May Scare-Off Venezuela Vulture Investors,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 28, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-28/whitehouse-sanctions-may-scare-off-venezuela-vulture-investors.
22. See generally NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2012).
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restructure; and (3) the fact that Venezuela has extensive contracts and
assets abroad that could potentially be seized by holdout creditors who
might still be entitled to full payment after restructuring efforts have
concluded.
First, the overarching challenge is that the legal structure of the debt is
heterogeneous, as the legal terms relevant to restructuring vary across
PDVSA’s and Venezuela’s bonds. Specifically, PDVSA debt
(approximately $27 billion)23 is issued under a trust indenture and does not
contain any CACs that would allow modification of some key terms of the
indenture (“Reserved Matters,” such as payment terms) by a bondholder
supermajority. Amendments to those matters instead require unanimous
consent. Venezuela’s debt (totaling approximately $37 billion),24 on the
other hand, is divided into three categories with respect to CACs: (1) pre–
2003 issued debt that contains no CACs and thus requires unanimous
consent for amendments to “Reserved Matters”, (2) 2003–2004 issued debt,
with an 85% threshold for amendments, and (3) post-2004 issued debt with
a 75% threshold to amend “Reserved Matters”. In addition, PDVSA bonds
require a simple majority to amend non-Reserved Matters, while Venezuela
debt requires a 66.67% majority to make such amendments. Importantly,
these voting thresholds need to be reached on a series-by-series basis (i.e.
reached on each series of issued debt) rather than on an aggregate basis (i.e.
reached by tallying the votes of all debt-holders).
A second challenge, which is unique to restructuring Venezuela’s
bonds containing CACs, and has been overlooked by some
commentators,25 is that even amendments to certain non-payment terms
require a qualified 75% or 85% supermajority. Such terms include:
sovereign immunity, jurisdiction, governing law, and place of payment. In
other words, the scope of the “Reserved Matters” has been extended in
Venezuela CAC bonds to include several important terms beyond the
payment terms. This may restrict the scope of exit consent use – a
technique that, as explained, allows a qualified majority of bondholders to
amend certain non-payment terms in the bonds upon deciding to exchange
them, binding all remaining non-exchanging bondholders. Therefore,
Venezuela’s restructuring is challenging because of non-uniformity in both
the voting thresholds across the bonds needed for amendments, and the
terms that these voting thresholds can amend. This debt heterogeneity

23. Walker & Cooper, supra note 6, at 3.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 25.
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means that one might be unable to approach the entirety of the debt with a
one-size-fits-all restructuring strategy.
But more generally, relying on reaching particular majority thresholds
to effectuate a restructuring is problematic whenever holdout creditors are
able to buy additional outstanding debt to prevent the majority threshold
from being reached (i.e. become holders of at least 26% of a debt series to
prevent a 75% CAC). Holdout buying of such “blocking” positions can
effectively prevent the use of any threshold-based restructuring strategy.
This problem is particularly acute when CACs and exit consents operate on
a series-by-series rather than aggregate basis, as it is relatively cheaper for
a holdout to buy a blocking position.
Third, the fact that Venezuela has extensive assets abroad presents a
distinct challenge. Holdout bondholders may try to convince a court that,
even though they chose not to exchange, they still have an enforceable right
to full payment under their existing bonds. Venezuela’s foreign assets
would be the number one potential source of such payment, and any
restructuring technique that leaves holdout creditors entitled to timely and
full payment gives rise to ownership claims over those assets.
While each of these three challenges make a restructuring
complicated, they are certainly not debilitating. Both PDVSA and
Venezuelan debt contain modified pari passu provisions that can be read to
permit changes in the ranking of payment obligations via Venezuelan
legislation. Using pari passu could significantly mitigate the above
challenges in at least three ways.
First, while the debt is otherwise heterogeneous with regard to
contract terms, the same pari passu provision is included in all PDVSA
bonds and in the vast majority of Venezuela bonds (all Venezuelan bonds
except for non-CAC bonds). Successfully using our pari passu-based
subordination strategy could therefore help restructure most of Venezuela’s
external debt (approximately 90%), and would require deferring to other
techniques to restructure only a minority (approximately 10%) of
outstanding debt.26 Second, this technique virtually entirely avoids the
challenge presented by holdouts buying blocking positions. While holdouts
would only have to buy a fraction of PDVSA or Venezuelan debt in order
to block the application of exit consents or CACs, they would have to buy
100% of the entire debt to avoid the subordination of their claims under our
26. The outstanding debt amounts to approximately $64 billion. Non-CAC debt amounts to
approximately $6 billion. As only non-CAC debt does not contain the modified pari passu provision,
this means that the provision can be used to restructure approximately 90% of the outstanding external
debt.
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approach. The fact that it only takes a few creditors of any debt-series
exchanging their bonds to subordinate the claims of all holdouts makes the
subordination approach particularly appealing. Third, the fact that nonexchanged debt could be subordinated to exchanged debt under Venezuelan
law means that holdouts would no longer have a residual right to payment
equal to that of exchanging bondholders. Therefore, they would not have an
immediate right to any Venezuelan and/or PDVSA assets given that their
right to payment would be secondary to the payment right of exchanging
bondholders. Therefore, until all exchanging bondholders are paid, foreign
assets would be safe from destabilizing holdout seizures.
In attempting to use the pari passu provision in its favor, Venezuela
may benefit from the precedent established by Argentina’s debt
restructuring adjudication in NML v. Argentina27 in at least two ways. First,
even though the language of the pari passu provision in Venezuela’s bonds
is different than in Argentina’s, the court’s interpretation of the clause is
beneficial to our approach. In NML v. Argentina, the court focused on the
specific contractual language and concluded that all parts of the clause
should be given effect whenever possible.28 This is of paramount
importance because, as explained, the clauses at issue here include a
qualification that the debt can be subordinated according to Venezuelan
law. Under the NML v. Argentina interpretative precedent, this
qualification is a part of the clause that cannot be disregarded and must be
given effect. Second, Argentina’s holdout creditors convinced the court to
adopt their “ratable payments” interpretation of the clause. In other words,
Argentina’s holdouts persuaded the court that they had read the clause and
understood it as ensuring “ratable payments” when buying Argentina’s
debt. Given that the sovereign debt market has relatively few, but repeat,
players, Venezuela’s potential holdout creditors may reasonably overlap
with Argentina’s. In that case, it would be difficult for Venezuela’s holdout
creditors to argue that they did not contract with Venezuela with the
particular modified clause in mind, since they had so carefully
contemplated the meaning of the clause in Argentina’s bonds. Similarly,
Venezuela would have a strong case that the creditors must have taken the
clause into account when purchasing the bonds and, as a result, the clause
simply allocates the risk of debt subordination to creditors.

27. Argentina’s famous debt restructuring litigation spanned a period of over 10 years, after the
country defaulted on its debt in 2001 and attempted to restructure in 2005 and 2010. See generally Lee
C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Restructuring Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina, Cap. Mkts. L. J. vol
12, no. 2, 224.
28. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 669 F.3d 249, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2012).
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More recent court decisions on debt restructuring may also be
beneficial for Venezuela. Specifically, the Second Circuit’s decision in
Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt., Corp. extended the scope of
the use of exit consents,29 providing debtors in distress like Venezuela
greater flexibility in utilizing this technique when needed. Thus, while
using exit consents might not be effective as a primary strategy, this leaves
room for their use as a supplementary option.
Having discussed some important ways in which Venezuela could
mitigate the challenges in restructuring its debt, we now proceed with our
specific proposals for restructuring PDVSA and Venezuelan debt.
III. PDVSA DEBT RESTRUCTURING: SUBORDINATION OF NONEXCHANGED DEBT
A. Applicable Contractual Provisions
PDVSA bonds are notable for the general uniformity of their key
provisions. Specifically, all PDVSA bonds lack CACs, include a simple
majority threshold for amending non-payment terms, and incorporate a pari
passu provision that states:
The Notes and the Guaranty will be the unsecured, senior obligations of
the Issuer and the Guarantor and will rank pari passu with all other
senior unsecured obligations of the Issuer and the Guarantor, in each
case other than obligations granted preferential treatment pursuant to
the laws of Venezuela.30

In addition, the “Risk Factors Relating to the Notes” restate the
provision:
The Notes will be our senior unsecured obligations. The payment of
principal and interest on the Notes will be effectively subordinated in
right of payment to all of our secured indebtedness and to creditors given
a statutory priority under applicable law . . . .31

B. Strategic Use of Pari Passu
The pari passu provision in the bonds leaves open the opportunity to
use Venezuelan law in the restructuring. In our view, use of this provision
may suffice to instill a credible fear among potential holdouts that if they
do not participate in a restructuring and tender their bonds, their bonds will
be subordinated and they may be left virtually unpaid. Importantly, if this
29. See generally Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 846 F.3d 1 (2d Cir.
2017).
30. Prospectus, PDVSA Senior Notes, 12.75% Due 2022 (emphasis added).
31. Id. (emphasis added).
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fear is viewed as legitimate in a post-NML v. Argentina paradigm,
PDVSA/Venezuela may not need other costly means of incentivizing
creditors to effectuate a restructuring, such as stripping PDVSA of its right
to exploit oil,32 or forcing PDVSA into bankruptcy.33 Moreover, PDVSA
would not need to aggressively use exit consents to achieve a successful
restructuring.34
In fact, solely using exit consents may prove insufficient for two
reasons. First, and most importantly, the technique can be blocked if
holdouts purchase 51% of any debt series, which is the majority threshold
needed for using an exit consent strategy. Second, the technique might not
guard against the possibility of holdouts seizing PDVSA assets. As
discussed in Part I, holdouts could attempt to seize PDVSA/Venezuelan
assets as a means of receiving full and timely payment. This is likely
because, absent our legislative debt subordination solution, holdouts would
still have a right to payment equal to that of exchanging bondholders –
since exchanged notes would not qualify as “obligations granted
preferential treatment according to the laws of Venezuela.”35 Exit consents
alone are unlikely to mitigate this problem because an exit consent strategy
may not be used to remove the pari passu clause, which, without legislative
intervention, ensures the debts’ equal ranking. The terms of the bonds
would likely prohibit the removal of the clause without unanimous
bondholder consent.36 The only exit consent use that could be effective in
minimizing the risk of asset-seizures is one that would allow a majority of
bondholders to change the notes’ “Obligor;” a suggestion set forth by Lee
Buchheit and Mitu Gulati.37 Changing the Obligor (the entity carrying the
obligation to pay the debt) from PDVSA to a new entity means that any
holdout can only pursue the new entity’s assets for recovery. While this

32. See Restructuring Debt in the Dark, supra note 19. Asset stripping can however be seen as a
way for the government to “intentionally bleed” the company for governmental gain, which creditors
can use to pierce the veil between the government and PDVSA and seize Venezuelan assets.
33. See generally Walker & Cooper, supra note 6 (detailing this bankruptcy proposal).
34. A few experts have advocated for this approach. See e.g., How to Restructure Venezuelan
Debt, supra note 5; Walker & Cooper, supra note 6.
35. Prospectus, PDVSA Senior Notes, 12.75% Due 2022.
36. PDVSA bonds state in relevant part that “no amendment may subordinate the Notes in right
of payment to any other Indebtedness of the Issuer” and “no amendment may impair the right of each
Holder to receive payment of principal of, premium, if any, interest and Additional Amounts if any, on
such Note on or after the due date thereof . . .” See, e.g., id. at 111. Using exit consents to remove the
clause entirely would likely be in breach of at least the second of the two above provisions.
37. See How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt, supra note 5, at 7–11.
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technique would likely be effective in containing the asset-seizure risk,38 it
can do nothing to address the risk of holdouts buying a controlling position
and blocking the application of the technique altogether. Invoking the pari
passu provision and proceeding with a debt subordination strategy may
therefore prove invaluable, if not necessary, for PDVSA’s successful
restructuring.
To make the provision work in Venezuela’s favor, the Venezuelan
government could pass a statute that subordinates non-exchanged debt to
exchanged debt. In other words, exchanging creditors would receive
statutory priority and preferential treatment (vis-à-vis potential holdouts)
under Venezuelan law. Venezuela could announce the new law either
before or after an Exchange Offer has been announced. If introduced before
an Exchange Offer, the law would ensure that in the case of a future debt
restructuring (1) initiated by the state (or state-owned entities) (2) with
regards to specific debt series, and (3) executed via Exchange Offers, nonexchanged external debt would be subordinated to exchanged debt.
Creditors would therefore be entering the exchange negotiations with the
law already in place. If introduced when an Exchange Offer is already
underway, the law may not have to be formally enacted at all, as long as the
Exchange Offer prospectus clearly articulates the possibility of the
legislative subordination of non-exchanged debt.39 We believe it is
preferable to commence an Exchange Offer before introducing a statute
regarding debt subordination. Enacting a law before the commencement of
an Exchange Offer may simply lead bondholders to sell their bonds to
vulture funds that are more likely to hold out and resort to litigation rather
than exchange. Regardless of the relative timing of the statute’s potential
enactment and Exchange Offer, however, the fear of non-payment to
holdouts would be credible. The cautionary language in the Exchange Offer
prospectus could hypothetically read as follows:
PDVSA does not foresee that it will have the resources to pay nonExchanged Notes under their existing terms. In addition, and as
explicitly provided in the terms of the existing Notes, the Exchanged
Notes may be given statutory priority and enjoy preferential treatment in
right of payment vis-à-vis Non-Exchanged Notes according to
Venezuelan legislation.

38. This assumes that the new entity is structured in a way that legally and effectively separates it
from PDVSA. Otherwise, creditors of this new company may attempt to seize PDVSA assets by
“piercing the corporate veil,” convincing a court that PDVSA and the new entity are not sufficiently
distinct to warrant legal separation of obligations.
39. This possibility would be introduced as a risk in a hypothetical bond prospectus section titled
“Risks of Not Participating in the Offer.”
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This language sufficiently warns that non-exchanged notes may
remain in default, but also leaves room for PDVSA and Venezuela to pay
holdouts if the holdouts are few enough that paying them would be more
cost-effective than litigating against them.
We must note that the success of this plan does not depend on the
ability of the current or any future government to formally pass the
required law. It will certainly suffice if creditors merely perceive the
government as willing and able to pass the legislation at any given point in
time.
C. Additional Incentives to Participate: “Carrots and Sticks”
If PDVSA does not think that threatening to subordinate holdout debt
alone would be sufficient to maximize creditor participation, it can proceed
with the following supplementary options.
First, PDVSA could incentivize bondholders to accept the new bonds
issued in the Exchange Offer by making them contractually attractive. For
example, one such incentive could be the inclusion of a typical pari passu
provision instead of a modified one, which would exclude the possibility of
subordination according to Venezuelan law and make those new bonds
harder to restructure. Another monetary incentive would be the inclusion of
oil warrants in the new bonds that would guarantee payment to bondholders
(in addition to coupons) if and when the oil market rebounds.
Second, PDVSA could utilize exit consents. This means that, as a
condition for exchanging their bonds, 51% of bondholders would have to
consent to amending certain non-payment terms of the old bonds when they
exchange them. To the extent that these terms are sufficiently valuable,
bondholders would rather hold new bonds of reduced NPV instead of old
bonds of full value but amended contractual terms. One term that has been
suggested as amenable to change is that of the Obligor, as mentioned
earlier. Indeed, Lee Buchheit and Mitu Gulati suggest that delegating the
debt obligations of PDVSA to a new and less trustworthy entity is
contractually permissible and the best use of the exit consent strategy in
this context.40 Another term that could be changed is the place of payment.
Changing the place of payment from New York to Venezuela would induce
potential holdouts to exchange because Venezuela currently has strict
capital controls that would make it harder for would-be-holdouts to
expatriate their bond payments.

40. See How to Restructure Venezuelan Debt, supra note 5, at 7.
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But as noted, an exit consent strategy would ideally come after a debt
subordination strategy, and only if necessary. We find it likely that exit
consents would not be needed if the subordination of the bonds were to be
considered legally viable at the time of the Exchange Offer. In the past,
bond subordination threats have successfully worked to incentivize
bondholders to exchange their bonds. For instance, Argentina did not use
exit consents in its debt restructuring. Instead, Argentina passed the “Lock
Law,” a variant of our contemplated Venezuelan law, halting payments to
non-exchanging bondholders. As a result of the law, 93% of bondholders
chose to exchange. Since the contemplated use of a similar law here is
more legitimate than in the case of Argentina – as the possibility of such
law being passed is implicitly recognized in PDVSA bonds’ pari passu
provision – we anticipate that the level of creditor participation could
match or exceed that of Argentina, thus minimizing the need for additional
restructuring techniques.
D. Legal Risks, Challenges, and Defenses
Our restructuring proposal is not risk-free. Potential holdouts could
bring legal challenges to the recommended subordination technique. These
challenges would likely relate primarily to the proper interpretation and use
of the pari passu provision, as well as to the retroactivity of subordination.
We explain, however, why these challenges are surmountable. Further, we
defend against challenges to the use of exit consents as described above.
1. Interpretation of Contractual Language
Our proposal risks having holdouts challenge Venezuela’s
interpretation and use of the modified pari passu provision. Holdouts could
argue that Venezuela’s interpretation is inconsistent with the original intent
of the contracting parties and it should therefore be disregarded. In
particular, they would try to argue that (1) the qualifying language included
in the pari passu provision is either boilerplate language or a drafting error
that does not reflect contractual intent; or (2) there are alternative
interpretations that are more “creditor friendly” and do not allow nonexchanged debt to be subordinated to exchanged debt. Regardless of the
strategy holdouts choose to use to try to discredit Venezuela’s
interpretation, we believe that New York contract interpretation principles
weigh in favor of Venezuela.
As a threshold matter, there is no case law or treatise interpreting this
particular variant of the pari passu provision in a sovereign debt contract.
While the fact that this particular language has not been tested in court is a
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risk, it also means that our proposition is doctrinally possible. In fact,
prominent academics believe that similar language supplementing other
pari passu provisions entitles a sovereign to “forbid payment to holdout
creditors.”41 But what is more important is that the parties to the contract
are sophisticated, are likely repeat players in the market, and have agreed to
the negotiated terms of the debt contract. The pari passu language itself
makes clear that (1) there are PDVSA obligations that (2) can be given
preferential treatment in terms of ranking (3) by Venezuela’s laws. These
“obligations” reasonably include debt obligations, which must also be
“senior” and “unsecured” (e.g. new exchanged notes).
When dealing with sophisticated parties and explicit contractual
language, New York courts overwhelmingly give deference to the
contractual language as the best indicator of intent.42 Therefore, the
inclusion of the qualification should not be disregarded as “boilerplate” or
“a drafting error,” but instead viewed as a risk allocation mechanism
whereby bondholders bear the risk of having their debt subordinated to
other Venezuelan obligations, including exchanged debt. The fact that the
provision appeared in several parts of the offering document further
reinforces the argument that bondholders assumed the risk of subordination
after receiving sufficient disclosure.
In addition, if holdouts argue that the provision should be given a
meaning different than Venezuela asserts, they would have to offer
alternative interpretations for the kind of obligations that can receive
legislative preference (in lieu of exchanged debt). The holdout would have
to find an example of an obligation that would fall under the provision and
be a “senior unsecured obligation of the issuer,” as the pari passu
41. See, e.g., Stephen Choi et. al., Variation in Boilerplate: Rational Design or Random
Mutation? 9–10 (NYU Sch. of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 16-34,
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2827189. The authors argue that a “Mandatory Law” exception in pari
passu clauses subjects the clause to application of mandatory local law, and allows a sovereign to
change its local law to forbid the payment to holdout creditors.
42. See, e.g., Ashwood Capital, Inc. v. OTG Mgt., Inc., 99 A.D.3d 1, 7 (2012) (“According to
well-established rules of contract interpretation, ‘when parties set down their agreement in a clear,
complete document, their writing should as a rule be enforced according to its terms’. We apply this
rule with even greater force in commercial contracts negotiated at arm’s length by sophisticated,
counseled businesspeople . . . We . . . concern ourselves ‘with what the parties intended, but only to the
extent that they evidenced what they intended by what they wrote’.”); Syncora Guar. Inc. v. EMC
Mortg. Corp., No. 09 Civ. 3106 (S.D.N.Y., June 19, 2012) (citing British Int’l. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Seguros
La Republica, S.A., 342 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2003) (“When interpreting a written contract, the Court
seeks ‘to give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in the unequivocal language they have
employed.’”); Gary Friedrich Enterprises, LLC v. Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d 302, 313 (2d Cir.
2013) (“When interpreting a contract [under New York law], the ‘intention of the parties should control,
and the best evidence of intent is the contract itself’”).
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qualification only applies toward such obligations.43 Even more
challenging than offering a list of plausible alternative obligations,
however, would be to argue that the list is exhaustive and excludes
exchanged debt as an obligation that could receive statutory priority.
Holdouts could counter-argue that if the contract gave Venezuela the
power to subordinate holdout debt, the risk would be reflected in the price
of the bonds. However, in the case of PDVSA, empirical price observations
may prove inconclusive. PDVSA bonds contain many legal terms that
could have been priced into the contract. If, for instance, one expected the
pari passu provision to make the bonds tradable at a discount, that price
effect could have been counteracted by the fact that the bonds require
unanimous consent to amend payment and other terms. The latter makes
the bonds “safer” for investors and would, all other things being equal,
make them trade at a premium. Any price effect of the pari passu provision
would thus be nullified. To properly isolate the price effect of pari passu,
an econometric analysis would have to control for every other legal term.
That would require a large data set of PDVSA bonds that differ in their
legal terms. But, as previously mentioned, PDVSA bonds are uniform in
their legal structure, thus making empirical analyses difficult to conduct.
A further risk is that holdouts could draw a parallel between
Venezuela’s law and Argentina’s “Lock Law.” In the latter case, the law
effectively halted payments to all holdout creditors and was found to be in
breach of the Argentine pari passu provision. The law was ultimately
considered such an extraordinary and unwarranted measure that it justified
an injunction by New York federal courts to induce full payment of holdout
creditors. However, this would be a contextually false analogy. Put simply,
Argentina’s pari passu provision – unlike PDVSA/Venezuela’s – did not
include a qualification that all external debt ranks pari passu unless some
obligations are granted preferential treatment by legislation. Thus, while
Venezuela’s law may resemble Argentina’s, unlike Argentina, the law in
Venezuela’s case is wholly consistent with the pari passu language.
A third, albeit smaller, risk is a potential holdout argument that
Venezuela breached an implied “duty of good faith” by using local law to
subordinate non-exchanged debt, essentially coercing bondholders to
exchange their bonds. But the fact that the pari passu provision contained a
qualification regarding the applicability of Venezuelan law weakens such
arguments. U.S. contract law (and New York law in particular) has
43. Recall that the provision states the “notes rank pari passu with all other senior unsecured
obligations. . .other than [senior unsecured] obligations granted preferential treatment . . .” See
Prospectus, PDVSA Senior Notes, 12.75% Due 2022.
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generally held that a good faith duty cannot provide bondholders with
rights inconsistent with a bond’s express terms.44 Generally, when the
issuer acts according to a bond’s express provisions, good faith claims are
unavailable.45 Given the unavailability of a good faith argument, holdouts
cannot easily raise claims of coercion either, at least not the type of
coercion that a court would likely find unacceptable.46
2. Retroactive Subordination and Expropriation
Additional challenges to the proposed subordination technique may
stem from its retroactive nature. Venezuela did not have a law at the time
of issuance stipulating that future exchanged debt would enjoy statutory
priority. Retroactive application of law could give rise to claims of
expropriation.47 But Venezuela can raise three defenses.
First, mere subordination of non-exchanged debt most likely does not
constitute expropriation. Bondholders would theoretically receive their
payment as resources become available in the case of default. This is not
the same as a situation in which bondholders are told explicitly that they
will never receive any payment – as was the case in Argentina – and see
their property rights virtually extinguished. An expropriation claim also has
to show that expropriation was discriminatory (here, as against foreign
bondholders). Here, all non-exchanging bondholders will be treated the
same, whether they are Venezuelan residents or foreigners, so there is no
evidence of discrimination.
Second, if expropriation were found to have occurred, Venezuela
could use the state action doctrine as a defense. The state action doctrine
provides that U.S. courts “[w]ill not judge the validity of official acts of a

44. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“In
contracts like bond indentures, an implied covenant [of good faith] . . . derives its substance directly
from the language of the indenture and cannot give Bondholders any rights inconsistent with those set
out in the indenture.”).
45. See William Bratton & Adam Levitin, The New Bond Workouts 95 (Institute for Law and
Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law Sch., Research Paper No. 17-9, 2017),
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2734&context=faculty_scholarship;
William Bratton & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 66 (2004).
46. This follows because “coercion” in restructuring proceedings is usually based on a finding of
a breach of duty of good faith. See generally Bratton & Gulati, supra note 47.
47. See generally Melissa A. Boudreau, Restructuring Sovereign Debt Under Local Law: Are
Retrofit Collective Action Clauses Expropriatory?, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 164 (2012),
http://www.hblr.org/?p=2283 (last visited Nov. 18, 2017).
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foreign government carried out within its territory.”48 Creditors would most
likely challenge this defense on the grounds that the Second Hickenlooper
Amendment49 limits the application of the state action doctrine in
expropriation claims and actually compels U.S. courts to make a
determination by invoking international law. However, while this may
appear to suggest that expropriation claims are in fact within the purview of
U.S. courts, the Hickenlooper Amendment has been applied very narrowly
because decisions affecting U.S. foreign relations are typically left to the
purview of the executive branch.50 Granted, the defense of state action is
used predominantly in U.S. court litigation. But if the expropriation claims
are instead arbitrated, the defense would not carry the same weight in
arbitration proceedings.
Third, a justification for passing legislation that is grounded in “public
necessity” gives Venezuela an affirmative defense against expropriation
claims in both courts and arbitration tribunals. With a view to the disastrous
potential consequences of default, Venezuela could claim that its actions
were warranted out of public necessity, a consideration that often
outweighs any sovereign’s duty to creditors. In mounting this defense in
court proceedings, Venezuela would have to persuade a U.S. court to seek
guidance from international tribunals.51 International courts have ruled,
most recently in the case of the Greek restructuring decided by the
European Court of Human Rights, that consideration of public necessity
overrides duties to creditors in times of emergency.52 Granted, seeking
guidance from international tribunals does not necessitate the same
outcome by a U.S. court. But coupled with other factors (such as the
tendency for U.S. courts not to question the domestic laws of foreign
countries during times of emergency), we believe that a U.S. court holding
may be consistent with international decisions.
48. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (“Every sovereign State is bound to respect
the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of [a foreign government] done out within its own territory.”).
49. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2012).
50. See, e.g., Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo S.A. v. Entex Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir.
1982) (finding that the Hickenlooper Amendment was only intended to apply to cases involving claims
of title to American-owned property nationalized by a foreign government in violation of international
law).
51. In resolving such disputes, U.S. courts are prone to rely on guidance from international law.
See, e.g., West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 831 n.10 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding it
“appropriate to look to international law” to determine if a certain action constitutes a taking).
52. See, e.g., Olguín v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5, Award (July 26, 2001),
18 ICSID REV. 160 (2003) (noting that the taking was justified because it occurred within the context
of a broader financial crisis); Mamatas and Others v. Greece, 2016-Eur. Ct. H. R. 256.
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Most importantly, even if all defenses fail and the bondholders are
entitled to compensation, the typical remedy is for the bondholders to
receive the fair market value of the expropriated property. The fair market
value of most bonds in this case is already heavily discounted from their
original value. Therefore, the small percentage of creditors who may
choose to hold out and bring an expropriation claim would likely only get
paid a fraction of the original value of the bonds. Ironically, holdouts who
win an expropriation claim may end up receiving similar value for their
bonds as bondholders who chose to exchange their bonds, especially if the
new bonds’ value reflects the heavily discounted market value of existing
bonds.
3. Potential Challenges to Exit Consents
If an exit consent strategy is used, and exchanging bondholders amend
the “Guarantor” or place of payment, holdout creditors may argue that the
amendments breached the contract terms and/or were unduly coercive,
leaving them no meaningful choice but to exchange. We believe that in
either case, changing these terms through exit consents would not be
viewed by a court as a breach of the terms of the agreement nor as unduly
coercive. This is supported by the Second Circuit’s recent opinion in
Marblegate, where the court examined how exit consents interact with the
Trust Indenture Act (“TIA”) 316(b) language and held that contractual
amendments impairing one’s ability to receive payment are permissible as
long as they do not impair one’s right to receive payment.53 Here, changing
the Guarantor or place of payment may affect one’s ability to receive the
payment on time, but not one’s right.
To make a determination of whether the amendments to the
aforementioned terms were unduly coercive, a court may invoke the
doctrine of the intercreditor duty of good faith. Case law is scattered when
it comes to the application of good faith duties in restructuring contexts. A
large part of it is found in 19th century cases, which are still good law and
generally hold that bad faith actions are self-interested actions not in the

53. See generally Marblegate Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 846 F.3d 1 (2d Cir.
2017). While not governed by the statute per se, the language in PDVSA bonds strictly follows the TIA
language stating in relevant part that “[o]ther amendments of, modifications to and supplements to the
Indenture and the Notes may be made with the consent of the Holders of a majority in principal amount
of the then Outstanding Notes issued under the Indenture, except that, without the consent of each
Holder affected thereby, no amendment may . . . impair the right of each Holder to receive payment of
principal of, premium, if any, interest and Additional Amounts, if any, on such Note on or after the due
date thereof or to institute suit to enforce such payment.” Prospectus, PDVSA Senior Notes, 12.75%
Due 2022, at 110–11.

FAYYAD PUBLICATION VERSION(DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

12/8/2017 9:44 AM

RESTRUCTURING VENEZUELA’S DEBT USING PARI PASSU

205

best interests of the bondholders as a group. This would not include actions
undertaken for self-preservation or otherwise for private gain.54 Here, the
act of the majority of exiting creditors to amend certain terms arguably
qualifies as an act of self-preservation that will benefit bondholders as a
group by preventing a minority of creditors from holding out and getting a
disproportionate amount of available resources. More importantly, in more
recent U.S. cases, courts have given effect to a good faith duty only when it
arises directly from the language of the contract,55 or when a party’s actions
go against the reasonable expectations of the bondholders.56 The bond
contracts here contain an exhaustive list that explicitly prohibits a variety of
amendments without unanimous bondholder consent.57 The fact that
amending the place of payment or the Guarantor is not explicitly prohibited
means that such amendments via a qualified majority would fall within the
reasonable expectations of the parties. As a result, a court is unlikely to find
that such an amendment violates a good faith duty and is thus unduly
coercive.
IV. VENEZUELA’S EXTERNAL DEBT RESTRUCTURING
We recommend that Venezuela use a similar strategy to restructure its
own debt. As noted at the outset, the vast majority of the outstanding
Venezuelan bonds contain pari passu provisions that may allow for the
subordination of those bonds according to local law. The exact provision
states:
The Notes constitute Public External Indebtedness of the Republic and
(subject to “Negative Pledge” below) are direct, unconditional,
unsecured and general obligations of the Republic and shall at all times
rank pari passu and without any preference among themselves. The
payment obligations of the Republic under the Notes shall, save for such
exceptions as may be provided by applicable legislation and subject to
“Negative Pledge,” at all times rank at least equally with all its other
payment obligations relating to External Public Debt . . . .58

This provision exists in all CAC bonds (the post-2003 bonds).
However, non-CAC (pre-2003) bonds do not contain the exact provision
and make no reference to applicable law. Non-CAC debt stock is
54. See Bratton & Levetin, supra, note 47, at 93; see also Hackettstown National Bank v. D.G.
Yuengling Brewing Co., 74 F. 110, 112 (2d Cir. 1896).
55. Katz v. Oak Industries, 508 A.2d 873, 880–81 (Del. Ch. 1986).
56. Kass v. Eastern Airlines, 1986 WL 13008, at *1 (Del. Ch. 1986), aff’d, 518 A.2d. 983 (Del.
1986).
57. Prospectus, PDVSA Senior Notes, 12.75% Due 2022, at 110–11.
58. Prospectus, Venezuela Global Bonds, 13.625% Due 2018, at 16 [hereinafter Venezuela CAC
Bond].
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comprised of (1) a 1991-issued bond of $1.6 billion;59 (2) a 1997-issued
bond of $4 billion60 and (3) a 1998 issue of $750 million. These bonds
contain the following provision that makes no reference to “applicable
legislation”:
The Global Bonds will be direct, unsecured, general and unconditional
obligations of Venezuela. The Global Bonds will rank pari passu,
without any preference among themselves. The payment obligations of
Venezuela under the Global Bonds will at all times rank at least equally
with all other payment obligations of Venezuela relating to External
Public Debt.61

Ideally, Venezuela would homogenize the debt by repurchasing the debt
consisting of non-CAC bonds, especially if some issues are trading at a
discount. But repurchasing debt would require sufficient liquid funds to
cover the cost of the debt. Unless Venezuela could get emergency credit
from outside creditors, it would be unlikely to have sufficient liquidity to
engage in open market debt repurchasing. Thus, without outside credit,
homogenizing the debt would be unlikely, and a restructuring plan would
have to treat the two debt stocks differently.
A. Restructuring CAC-Bonds
1. First-Best Option: Legislative Subordination of Non-Exchanged
Debt
The payment obligations of the Republic under the notes shall rank
pari passu with all other external indebtedness, “save for such exceptions
as may be provided by applicable legislation.”62 This means that
Venezuela can amend the “applicable legislation” to subordinate future
non-exchanged debt to exchanged debt. As in the case of PDVSA debt, this
subordination can be actual or potential; in other words, Venezuela could
enact the legislation before an Exchange Offer, or threaten to enact the
legislation in the course of the Exchange Offer.
Using this subordination technique for the CAC-bonds is preferable to
simply relying on the operation of the CAC or using exit consents, as both
those techniques may prove ineffective. CAC bonds are not aggregated,
which means that the 75% or 85% threshold for amending the payment
terms has to be reached on a series-by-series basis. When the collective will
of the bondholders is exercised on a series-by-series basis, however,
59.
60.
61.
62.

Prospectus, Venezuela Collateralized Floating Rate Bonds, 6.75% Due 2020.
Prospectus, Venezuela U.S. Dollar-Denominated Unsecured Global Bonds, 9.25% Due 2027
Id. at 73.
Venezuela CAC Bond, supra note 60.
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financially powerful holdouts can block the application of a CAC by
buying a sufficient amount of debt that makes them a supermajority
debtholder.
If triggering the CAC proves impossible, the most viable remaining
option, absent the legislative subordination solution, would be to use exit
consents. Exit consents in CAC bonds would require the issuer to convince
at least 66.67% of bondholders to exchange their bonds and agree to amend
non-payment terms in the old bonds before they exit. But there are at least
two problems with using exit consents. First, powerful holdouts who can
block the operation of the CAC may also buy a blocking position to prevent
the use of exit consents. Second, even if holdouts do not acquire a blocking
position, exit consents would, on their own, likely be insufficient to induce
participation. To recall, an exit consent strategy only allows bondholders to
amend certain Non-Reserved Matters (matters that are not reserved for
amendment by the CAC majority). But CAC bonds simply include too
many terms as “Reserved Matters” that are amendable only via a
supermajority. These include changes in the governing law, jurisdiction,
immunity, currency, and even place of payment, thus leaving little room for
using exit consents effectively.
Our proposed subordination technique mitigates these problems
because it does not require convincing 66.67% or 75% of bondholders to
exchange. In other words, a potential holdout is afraid of a 66.7% majority
when confronted with the use of exit consents, and of a 75% or 85%
majority when confronted with the use of a CAC. When confronted with
the potential subordination of the bonds, however, the holdout is effectively
afraid of even that 1% that may choose to exchange, which can come from
any debt series. That is because it effectively only takes one bondholder to
choose to exchange (and receive statutory priority) for the holdouts’ debt to
be subordinated. As discussed previously in the context of PDVSA, this
means that holdouts would have to purchase the entire debt to eliminate the
risk of debt subordination.
In the event that the subordination technique does not immediately
induce 100% of bondholders to exchange – and even falls short of the
Argentinian precedent of 93% participation – it is highly likely that it may
still convince 75% or 85% of bondholders to exchange, triggering the
CACs and binding all bondholders to the restructured payment terms.
Therefore, while the CAC should not be the primary mechanism to
restructure CAC bonds, we see that, if necessary, it could serve as a
complementary mechanism to maximize participation.
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Debt subordination here would only work if the term “applicable
legislation” referred to Venezuelan law. Holdouts may argue that
“applicable legislation” refers to New York rather than Venezuelan law,
making the provision temporarily more ambiguous than the one in PDVSA
bonds that explicitly refers to Venezuelan law. They would base their
argument on the fact that New York law governs the contract, and hence
that the term “applicable” refers to New York law. However, rules of
contract interpretation, as well as common sense, weigh in favor of a
finding that “applicable legislation” refers to Venezuelan, rather than New
York, law. According to New York Courts, “it is a cardinal rule that a
contract should not be read to render any provision superfluous,”63 and a
contract interpretation “that has the effect of rendering at least one clause
superfluous or meaningless is not preferred and will be avoided if
possible.”64 The Second Circuit, in its contract interpretation of pari passu,
also maintained “a contract should not be interpreted in such a way as
would leave one of its provisions substantially without force or effect.”65 In
this case New York law governs the contract, which means that all
provisions of the contract are, by default, given effect according to New
York law. The pari passu provisions would still be subject to New York
legislation as a default rule under the contract. Therefore, it would be
superfluous to include the provision “save for such exceptions as may be
provided by applicable legislation”66 as a reference to New York law.
Since contract provisions should not be interpreted in a way that they
become superfluous, “applicable legislation” reasonably refers to
Venezuelan, not New York, legislation.
Additionally, evidence from Venezuela bond market pricing supports
our position that the provision refers to Venezuelan law. If the initial
hypothesis of an empirical test was that “applicable legislation” refers to
Venezuelan law, then one would expect to see, as here, Venezuelan bonds
that include the specific modified pari passu language valued less than
Venezuelan bonds without the language (such as pre-2003 bonds). This is
because the ability to successfully hold out is lower, and the possibility of
non-payment greater, when the modified pari passu clause is present.

63.
64.
65.
66.

Reyes v. Metromedia Software, Inc., 840 F.Supp.2d 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
LaSalle Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Nomura Asset Capital Corp., 424 F.3d 195, 206 (2d Cir. 2005).
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 249, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2012).
Venezuela CAC Bond, supra note 60.
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Indeed, a recent empirical paper on the pricing of Venezuelan bonds found
the hypothesis to be true.67
Finally, while holdouts could argue that the pari passu clause’s
language is simply boilerplate or that Venezuela has misinterpreted it, their
contention would not hold significant weight. For one thing, there is little
room for misinterpretation. The clause clearly states that there can be
legislative exceptions to the equal ranking of obligations guaranteed by
pari passu. And, there is no reason to believe that exchanged debt cannot
be identified as one such exception. It would also be difficult to argue that
the clause’s modification is boilerplate language and not intended to be
particularly meaningful, as pre-2003 bonds did not have any modifications
from a typical clause, but post-2003 bonds did. As such, it becomes clear
that Venezuela intentionally included the qualification or exception to pari
passu in Venezuela’s bonds after 2003, intending for it to be contractually
meaningful.
2. Second-Best Option: Exit Consents Plus CACs
Exit consents could be used, but only in conjunction with the CAC. In
other words, neither a standalone use of the CAC nor exit consents would
be enough to incentivize bondholders to participate in an exchange. Using
exit consents and CACs conjunctively is riskier than the legislative
subordination technique set forth above, as a court is more likely to view it
as coercive. It also presupposes that bondholders would not be able to buy
blocking positions. We explain here how it could work if we make that
assumption.
Venezuela would announce an Exchange Offer, under which holders
of the old bonds would be encouraged to exchange them for new bonds.
The payment terms of the new bonds would be altered to ensure a
decreased NPV, by either cutting the principal amount, or extending the
maturities and decreasing the interest rate. If, at the time of the proposed
exchange, Venezuela deems it unlikely that 75% or 85% of bondholders
will tender their bonds, the new bonds would include attractive terms
(“carrots”) in the hopes of having at least 66.67% of bondholders – the
minimum percentage of bondholders required for use of exit consents –
accept the exchange.68 If 66.67% of bondholders decide to exchange,
67. While the difference in pricing may have also been a result of post-2003 bonds including
CACs, the authors found that the pari passu provision also played a role in those bonds trading at a
discount. See generally Elena Cartletti et al., Pricing Contract Terms in a Crisis: Venezuelan Bonds in
2016, 11 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 540 (2016).
68. Possible “carrots” could include premium payments, oil warrants, or pari passu provisions
that do not allow for legislative subordination.
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Venezuela would then use an exit consent strategy so that those
bondholders could amend the terms of the old bonds before they exchanged
them (i.e. before they are no longer bondholders of the old bonds).69 In
order to compel the additional 9% of bondholders needed to reach the 75%
CAC threshold, bondholders would make the old bonds less attractive by
amending the old bonds’ non-payment terms, such as Events of Default and
Acceleration provisions.70 As a 75% supermajority, then, the exchanging
bondholders would have to consent to amending the “Reserved Matters” of
the old bonds, such as payment terms. In light of the outcome of a recent
British case on exit consents,71 the bondholder supermajority would
probably not extinguish the value of the old bonds. Instead, bondholders
would likely agree to make the payment terms of the old bonds identical to
the terms of the new bonds, effectively bypassing any significant coercion
arguments. Hence, the bondholders who decided to holdout would be
holding old bonds with identical NPV as the new bonds,72 as well as
amended non-payment terms. Even if the holdouts would now own 100%
of the old bonds post-exchange, no bondholder majority could re-amend
the payment terms to increase the bond’s value. They may be able to reamend non-payment terms, but that would still leave them with bonds of
the same (reduced) value as the new ones, minus the additional carrots that
were included in the new offered bonds. As a result, it would be in their
best interest to exchange rather than hold out.
B. Restructuring Venezuelan Non-CAC Bonds
Because the pre-2003 bonds do not include CACs and the bond
provisions do not explicitly leave room for debt subordination by
Venezuelan law, the best option for restructuring them is using a
combination of “carrots” (incentives) and “sticks” (exit consents).

69. The exiting bondholders will have to consent to amend the Bond themselves before they exit,
as well as transfer power of attorney to the government to vote on their behalf when they are no longer
able to vote. Contractually this seems possible. See Lee Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, How to Restructure
Greek Debt 9 (Duke Law Sch., Working Paper No. 47, 2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1603304.
70. These provisions define what events qualify as “default”, and whether a creditor can demand
immediate payment at that time.
71. See Assenagon Asset Mgmt. S.A. v. Irish Bank Resolution Corp., [2012] EWHC 2090 (Ch)
(Eng.) (finding that using exit consents in conjunction with the functioning of CACs was excessively
coercive when it virtually extinguished the value of non-exchanged bonds, far below their market
value).
72. In determining where to set the bonds NPV, bondholders can simply set it at the current
market value of the bonds, which is already discounted compared to the bonds’ original value.
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1. “Carrots”: Oil and GDP Warrants
To incentivize bondholders to participate in the restructuring, we
propose issuing bonds with oil and GDP warrants, which would allow
bondholders to recover some of the bond value lost in the restructuring.
Oil-linked bonds would guarantee payment to creditors if the oil market
rebounds. Equivalently, GDP-linked bonds would yield higher returns for
the bondholders throughout Venezuela’s broader economic recovery. GDP
warrants can be particularly valuable to investors because Venezuela’s
recovery will not only be a factor of rising oil prices, but will additionally
depend on broader economic reforms. Therefore, coupling GDP and oil
warrants ensures that creditors will adequately benefit from Venezuela’s
future economic recovery.
2. Exit Consents
In addition to incentivizing creditors to exchange, Venezuela could
use mechanisms to deter creditors from holding out, such as exit consents.
While Venezuela’s CAC bonds contain provisions barring amendments to
central provisions such as (i) the governing law, (ii) the ranking of the
bonds (pari passu provision), and (iii) the waiver of immunity, the older
non-CAC bonds do not include any such prohibitions; rather, they only
prohibit amendments of payment terms and currency. Therefore, the nonCAC bonds at issue here would allow a broader and thus more effective use
of exit consents.
V. CONCLUSION
Venezuela is confronting an unprecedented economic and financial
crisis. A restructuring is inevitable, and will require an effective strategy to
minimize costly litigation, improve debt sustainability, and free the
Government to deal with other pressing economic and humanitarian issues
facing the country. Given the heterogeneity of its debt stock, Venezuela’s
debt restructuring may prove to be a particularly complex affair. Recently
proposed restructuring strategies that rely on exit consents and Collective
Action Clauses may prove insufficient to encourage large creditor
participation in a restructuring. That is because those strategies leave room
for powerful holdouts to buy blocking positions to preclude the use of those
strategies altogether, and may also make it possible for them to seize
PDVSA’s and Venezuela’s assets abroad. Instead of using exit consents
and Collective Action Clauses as a sole or primary strategy, we believe that
utilizing the pari passu provision in PDVSA and Venezuela bonds is the
optimal option. Because the provision can be read to allow for
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subordination of the bonds according to Venezuelan law, Venezuela can
threaten the enactment of a law that subordinates non-exchanged debt to
exchanged debt, thus making timely payment of holdout creditors unlikely.
We believe fear of non-payment will compel creditors to join the Exchange
Offer rather than hold out, especially because a New York court would
likely find that using this technique is contractually permissible. This
proposal is appealing because it only requires a handful of creditors of any
debt series to exchange their bonds in order to subordinate all holdout debt.
Thus, Venezuela would not be concerned with reaching higher predetermined thresholds of creditor participation to effectuate the
restructuring. Further, since holdout debt would be subordinated, holdouts
would not have a primary claim over Venezuela’s or PDVSA’s assets
abroad, leaving those important assets available for payment of exchanging
bondholders and other productive uses.

